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Abstract 
Since the end of genocide in 1987 Zimbabwe has remained a zone of ‘conflicts’, and the 
enduring debates surrounding this genocide, especially in public-owned but state-controlled 
media, call for critical attention. Three years after independence, in 1980, Zimbabwe was 
plunged into a genocide named ‘Gukurahundi’ (meaning the rain that washes the chaff away 
after harvest) that lasted until 1987. This article argues that there has been a clash of 
‘interests’ playing out in the mediation of this yet-to-be-officially addressed genocide. 
Through evidence from public-owned media, the media that carry the official voice of the 
ruling party, I argue that public media have seen genocide from conflicting and complex 
angles, making it difficult to reach a consensus suitable for national building based on 
genocide truths, meanings and effects to Zimbabweans. I specifically use the Unity Accord-
associated holiday, the Unity Day, and its associated debates to pursue two arguments. First, 
public media have played an ambiguous role in appreciating the conflictual and multi-
pronged nature of the genocide within ZANU-PF. Second, public media have largely been 
supportive of, and even complicit in, official silences on genocide debates and memory. The 
article uses public sphere and narrative analysis as frameworks for understanding the 
operations of public media journalism in the mediation of genocide nearly 30 years after its 
occurrence.  
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Introduction  
When Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 the most urgent assignment for the 
victorious Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political elite was 
consolidation of power through the creation of a one-party state. This was done under the 
assumption that the struggle against colonialism had created a cohesive people-as-a-nation 
called Zimbabweans. Therefore, the national reconciliation project meant to incorporate 
whites as well as blacks into the new nation was ignored in favour of the creation of a 
functional party state (Kriger 2003). Two main challenges presented themselves in the newly 
independent state. White people’s receptivity and ‘readiness to confront the crisis of identity 
awaiting them’ became a challenge as some Rhodesians ‘had favoured the continuation of 
European privilege...’ (Fisher 2010: 23). Another challenge was bringing together into one 
nation two main ethnic groups, the Ndebele and the Shona (comprising about 16 per cent and 
80 per cent of the Zimbabwean population, respectively), who were burdened by historical 
ethnic animosities dating from the nineteenth century. There was an error of judgement on 
the nationalists’ part as they believed in ‘the misconceived notion that the liberation war 
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automatically created a nation’ (Mpofu 2013: 116) out of an ethnically diverse society 
characterized by the simmering ‘danger of an outburst of tribal feeling’ (Shamuyarira 1965: 
185; Sithole [1957–1979] 1980). 
 
The project of carving a formidable and cohesive nation state from these acrimonious ethnic 
groups resulted in the employment of grotesque violence that affected the predominantly 
IsiNdebele-speaking people and their inhabited areas of central and south-west Zimbabwe, 
whose effects still colour ethnic relations, national identity and the political landscape. 
Through evidence from state-controlled public-owned media, the media that carry the official 
voice of the ZANU-PF, I argue that state-controlled public media have seen genocide from 
conflicting and complex angles, making it difficult to reach a consensus on genocide truths, 
meanings and effects for Zimbabweans. I specifically use the Unity Accord-associated 
holiday, the Unity Day, and its associated debates to pursue two arguments. First, state-
controlled public media have played an ambiguous role in appreciating the conflictual and 
multi-pronged nature of the genocide within ZANU-PF. Second, the public media have 
largely been supportive of, and even complicit in, official silencing of genocide debates and 
memory. The genocide has been covered, to different extents, by a broad range of media like 
magazines, privately owned media and online media. Due to space constraints I limit myself 
to state-owned public media. Elsewhere in an article ‘When the subaltern speaks: citizen 
journalism and genocide “victims” voices online’ (Mpofu 2015). I looked at how new media 
were employed in the discussions and in empowering with a voice those members of the 
community affected by the genocide. The role of privately owned media, even though not 
covered in this article, remains a vital project to be pursued. So, to clarify, what this article is 
doing is looking at how state-controlled but public-owned media continue to mediate the 
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1980s genocide. What it is not doing is looking at how alternative media – i.e. online and 
privately owned media – are mediating the 1980s genocide. 
  
The staging grounds for this genocide have remained key leux de memoires of this genocide 
more than the liberation war. The centrality of place as a discursive site is important as 
genocide debates encompass issues relating to ethnicity, development, marginalization and 
governability. Gukurahundi, the code name for genocide, is a Shona term, which literally 
means the early rains that wash away the chaff after harvest. In other contexts it simply 
means washing away rubbish. The term is used in two senses: first, to refer to the Fifth 
Brigade militia that carried out the genocide or the perceived intentions of the violence, and 
second the deliberate attempt to exterminate the predominantly Ndebele peoples of the 
Matabeleland and Midlands regions. These regions were affected in dissimilar ways and this 
was seemingly informed by the levels of support held by the opposition Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union-Patriotic Front (PF-ZAPU) in those areas (Msindo 2012). The genocide left 
well in excess of 20,000 civilians dead (Muzondidya 2009, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; 
Alexander et al. 2000). In most elections people from these regions have tended to vote 
against ZANU-PF in what is commonly known as ‘protest voting’ in some instances. 
Mugabe’s spokesperson writing in The Herald (Anon. 2014c) has rightly argued that there 
are certain political leaders, especially opposition nationally or from Matabeleland and the 
Midlands, who own the ‘so-called Gukurahundi’ narrative, which has become an ‘investment 
of unfailing dividend’. The genocide is equally used by ZANU-PF and opposition 
movements in different measures for political advancements. 
 
There are varied versions of ‘truths’ both in the official and in the alternative public spheres 
about the genocide. President Mugabe in 1999 described the massacres as a moment of 
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madness that should never be repeated while the recently appointed vice president of 
Zimbabwe, Phelekezela Mphoko, a man accused of selling out his ZIPRA counterparts 
during the liberation war when he diverted weapons to ZANLA (some of which found their 
way to the South African intelligence and later to the colonial Rhodesian Selous Scouts), said 
the genocide was ‘a conspiracy of the West’ (Anon. 2015). Both statements are problematic 
because they attempt to promote silence at the expense of truth and healing that victims yearn 
for. ZANU-PF’s dominant narrative on the genocide as advanced by state-controlled media is 
replete with contradictions that largely mirror intra-party ideological and ethnic tensions 
characterizing the country’s unstable multidirectional nationalist project. ZANU-PF’s 
narrative at one point seeks to remember and at another forget the human rights violations of 
the 1980s’ genocide, thereby straining relationships between the state and survivors. What 
remains, however, is that these human rights violations have had implications in society: 
configuring ethnic relations, especially solidifying Ndebele particularism. Besides, the 
reverberations of the genocide induced fear and collective anxiety for individual survivors, 
perpetrators and bystanders. This fear is palpable in contemporary Zimbabwe because the 
people have not forgotten and the perpetrator still commands the organs of violence – the 
army and the police. 
 
This study addresses the following questions: What does Gukuruhundi mean to ZANU-PF in 
a context when its political legitimacy is under strain? What role have the state-controlled 
public media played in the coverage of the genocide-related Unity Accord holiday? What 
does the cultural nationalism accompanying the Unity Day commemorations reveal about the 
internal make-up of ZANU-PF.? To answer these questions the article uses journalistic 
reportage and debates from ZANU-PF as covered in the public-owned media to illustrate that 
perspectives on genocide are characterized by conflicting angling of stories making its 
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meanings to the current Zimbabwe circuitous. Walter Benjamin (1974) famously remarked 
that it is the winners who get to write history. Since capturing the state at independence in 
1980, ZANU-PF has used public-owned media to shape what Zimbabweans know, 
remember, think and forget about the genocide. The public-owned media that are the focus of 
this research are The Herald, The Chronicle, The Sunday News and The Sunday Mail. They 
fall under the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange-listed company, Zimbabwe Newspapers 
(Zimpapers 1980) Ltd, and 51 per cent of the shares are controlled by the state on behalf of 
the public. Technically, the public is the majority shareholder, and as the custodian of public 
power in the Zimpapers the ZANU-PF government has abused its powers such that it 
appoints the board of governors and editors and influences the coverage of issues. The way 
these narrate the nation falls neatly into a position that secures ZANU-PF’s place, justifies its 
behaviours and absolves the ruling party from any responsibility for the genocide.   
 
In the first part of the article I briefly historicize the Gukurahundi genocide before reviewing 
the literature on genocide. The same section proceeds to discuss the role of media as 
important institutions in conflict with a potential to prevent or exacerbate it. The latter part of 
the article is on the official public media and how they have reported on the genocide 
between 2000 and 2014. This period is important because it is the era when the genocide 
debates became more pronounced for many reasons, the most important of which were the 
fragility of ZANU-PF’s nationalism, growing mass dissent and the empowerment people 
gained through new media as organizational and alternative communicative tools to resist 
ZANU-PF’s flawed and yet dominant political discourses.  
 
Gukurahundi genocide: What happened? 
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Alleged dissident activities in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions between 1982 and 
1987 prompted Mugabe into deploying a mainly Shona-speaking crack military outfit called 
the ‘Fifth Brigade’ to hunt the dissidents. The Fifth Brigade, an army trained and 
‘traumatized’ by North Korean soldiers, operated as an independent unit from the structures 
of the national army and directly reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. When the genocide was underway those outside the regions 
of Matabeleland and Midlands did not know what was going on due to a media blackout by 
ZANU-PF. They were told that the government was dealing with ‘dissidents’. In 1983 the 
Catholic Archbishop, Karlen, wrote to Mugabe protesting about what he labelled ‘genocide’ 
in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. Mugabe responded harshly, calling the Catholic 
priests ‘a band of Jeremiahs with a band of foreign journalists “who were silent on the” 
heinous actions of ZAPU and its dissidents’ (Msindo 2012: 213). No one could grasp the 
intensity of the state terror then until the 1997 publication of the Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation genocide report. The seminal text of 
Alexander et al. on Violence & Memory (2000) gives the perspectives of former Zimbabwe 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) men who took to the bushes after failing to integrate 
into the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) citing tribalism, racism and favouritism 
among other things.   
 
After the liberation war the competing Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA) and the ZIPRA forces (armed elements of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, respectively) 
were supposed to be demobilized and integrated into the ZNA. However, historians suggest 
that most ZIPRA soldiers surrendered their arms and went to demobilization camps known as 
Assembly Points (APs) while ZANLA soldiers did not comply with this Lancaster House 
Agreement cease-fire clause and remained largely ‘unreliable, ill-disciplined and 
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unpredictable’ (Alexander et al. 2000: 182). Because of disgruntlements, some ZIPRA 
soldiers left the APs with their arms. Thereafter there were reports of banditry elements 
terrorizing farmers and killing tourists and villagers. According to Laakso (1999: 68) ‘some 
ex-guerrillas of ZIPRA… joined the dissidents or the so called super-ZAPU in protest against 
ZANLA leadership in the army ...’. The informants of Alexander et al. (2000) argue that they 
never intended to overthrow the Mugabe regime. Most dissidents argued that ‘the life-
threatening pressures of what they called “the situation” and their abandonment by their 
leaders, who were often in jail or actively disassociated themselves from and condemned 
their activities’ (Alexander et al. 2000: 192), forced them into dissident activities. Some of 
those who did not escape were killed or endured ill treatment as part of the ZNA. The 
dissidents posed a threat to national security, and in reaction Mugabe expelled ZAPU 
members from the government and tried to ‘prevent ZAPU’s activities [and operations] as a 
legal political party’ (Laakso 1999: 70). Some researchers suggest that ZANU-PF committed 
some ‘dissident’ activities and attributed these to ZIPRA forces (Msindo 2012; CCJP and 
LRF 1997; Todd 2007). While the South African-sponsored Super-ZAPU and the dissidents 
committed some atrocities, research suggests that the government, particularly through the 
Fifth Brigade and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), was responsible for over 90 per 
cent of the reported cases (Eppel 2008; CCJP and LRF 1997; Alexander et al. 2000; Msindo 
2012). 
 
However, blame was laid on PF-ZAPU and immediately Mugabe and ZANU-PF Members of 
Parliament suggested that Nkomo’s soldiers wanted to destabilize the ZANU-PF government 
and they were ‘dissidents’ – a politically loaded term protested by Nkomo who preferred to 
call these elements ‘bandits’, ‘lawless’, ‘out-laws’ ‘renegades’, ‘unruly elements’, etc. 
(Alexander et al. 2000; Msindo 2012). Mugabe argued that ‘ZANU is irretrievably bent on its 
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criminal path… time has now come for us to show this evil party our teeth. We can bite, and 
we shall bite’ (Saul and Saunders 2004: 958). This statement and subsequent violent attempts 
at exterminating ZAPU and its supporters have continued to haunt Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s 
political fortunes in genocide-affected regions. This is so especially because the attempt to 
quell these disturbances assumed both a genocidal and ethno-political form. Ethnicity became 
a marker for dissidence: that is, being Ndebele meant being a PF-ZAPU supporter and this 
inflated into being a dissident. The Matabeleland and Midlands parts of Zimbabwe became 
the centre of an attempt at creating a cohesive nation state through the grotesque method of 
violence, itself an inheritance from colonialism and liberation war based on a narrow belief 
that nationalism in the post-colony meant elimination of difference.  
Literature review: Genocide and the media 
Scholarship on violence, of which genocide is a part, has attracted controversy bordering on 
definitional crises, theoretical and methodological questions that violence as a field of study 
has been encumbered with (Kapteijns and Ritchters 2010; Donham 2006). Huttenbach (1999: 
167) argues that genocide studies lack ‘both a satisfactory conceptual definition and a 
consensus as to the inner make-up of genocide… the search for an adequate definition can 
often lead to greater confusion and even controversy, bitterly divisive at times’. Robben and 
Nordstrom (1995: 12) are anxious of the possibility of representing violence in writing, as 
attempting to resolve violence in narrative makes it lose its ‘absurdity and 
incomprehensibility; paradoxically the very qualities that we would like to convey’.  
 
The difficulties in engaging on discourses on violence become apparent as: 
In peeling back the layers of the many realities that impinge on this question of what 
violence is, we find that even the most horrific acts of aggression do not stand as 
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isolated exemplars of a ‘thing’ called violence but cast ripples that configure lives in 
the most dramatic of ways, affecting constructs of identity in the present, the hopes 
and potentialities of the future, and even renditions of the past. (Robben and 
Nordstrom 1995: 5 in Kapteijns and Richters 2010: 4)  
 
There is, however, an approach that we could use to study violence despite definitional and 
methodological hurdles. Robben and Nordstrom rightly point out that: 
 
Violence is a dimension of living. Attempts to apply equations of rationality or 
irrationality or to adjudicate violent events as meaningful or meaningless are beside 
the point because they are based on the misguided assumption that violence should be 
understood in terms of its function and objective. Violence may be carried out with 
logical precision, which does not make it reasonable, and is imbued with meaning, 
even though often emotionally senseless. Our search is not for cause and function but 
for understanding and reflexivity. (in Kapteijns and Richters 2010: 4) 
 
While the article touches on the possible causes, which I call the three theses of the genocide, 
my main agenda here is to reflect and understand how ZANU-PF has, for political reasons, 
silenced and skewed genocide debates. This article reflects on selective official silences and 
memories of and on the Gukurahundi genocide. The official silence by the perpetrators and 
treatment of open genocide deliberations as a risky occupation have made it difficult to come 
up with the ‘truth’. This official silence amplifies certain underlying tensions born out of the 
genocide. 
 
11 
 
Since the end of the genocide there has been a growing body of research on this previously 
taboo area of academic enquiry. The CCJP and LHR (1997) report was path breaking as it 
confronted ZANU-PF with well-documented evidence of suffering caused by the genocide. 
Anthropologists Worby (1998) and Werbner (1991, 1998) have done some seminal work too 
on the genocide. Alexander et al. (2000), just like CCJP and LHR (1997), undertook an 
extensive research that documented witnesses’ and victims’ accounts. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2009) and Msindo (2012) have also made tremendous contributions that shift away from 
celebratory texts that characterized the formative years of new Zimbabwe nationalism. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) partly attributes lack of national cohesion and a distinctly 
Zimbabwean national identity to the genocide. Similarly, Msindo (2012) and Muzondidya 
(2009) agree that the genocide engendered a sense of alienation from the nation and ethnic 
particularism among the Ndebele community of Zimbabwe, leading to Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2009) questioning the existence of ‘Zimbabweans’ as a nation. Again the Ndebele ethnic 
group is itself composed, just like the Shona, of sub-ethnic groups, some of which do not 
subscribe to certain aspects advocated for by some Ndebele pressure groups and ideologies. 
Mpofu quotes a discussant in an online debate on issues of belonging and the Mthwakazi 
mythic state as saying about the latter’s agenda for secession:  
 
[…] if Ndebele want their own state, Kalangas we will want ours too. The Kalanga 
people we will oppose your Mthwakazi state. We are not the dissidents of Mzilikazi 
or Lobengula. Zuma is in power so you guys, could easily negotiate to be moved back 
to kzn. Matebelelnd belongs to the Kalanga people [sic]. (2014a: 273) 
 
Historically, according to Mpofu (2014a: 274) Kalangas have always resisted Ndebele 
domination fearing, as Msindo (2012) reports, losing their language, identity and culture. On	
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the	whole,	the	Ndebele	ethnic	group	seem	unified	on	the	memory	of	Gukurahundi,	
whose	memory	is	used	as	a	site	of	resistance,	resentment	and	expression	of	multiple	
grievances	towards	Shona	triumphalism,	domination	and	national	identity. As such, 
scholars have agreed that this period informs questions on governance, identity, development 
and politics in Matabeleland and Midlands regions (Msindo 2012; Mpofu 2014a, 2014b; 
Muzondidya 2009; Eppel 2008; Mhlanga 2012). This study adds a new dimension to this 
literature by questioning the role of state-controlled media and its mediation of the genocide 
between 2000 and 2015.  
 
What makes discussions on Gukurahundi genocide more problematic is that there have not 
been official attempts to address this episode as happened through truth commissions in 
South Africa and Rwanda that address apartheid and ethnic genocide, respectively, just to 
mention examples closer to Zimbabwe. There are three possible reasons for Gukurahundi: 
some argue that it was an ethnic war meant to exterminate Ndebeles from the face of the land 
while others argue that it was caused by South Africa’s sponsorship of Super ZAPU to 
destabilize the newly independent state. The third explanation is that it was an attempt by 
Mugabe to create a one-party state and therefore he had to get rid of his opponents and 
supporters (Laakso 1999; Kriger 2003; Masunungure 2006). Besides, official silence, denial 
of culpability and refusal to allow open engagements on the issue by ZANU-PF have been a 
source of pain to most victims, leading to formulations of ‘perceptions that their plight is 
unacknowledged’ (CCJP and LRF 1997: 3) and advancing ethnicity as the main reason for 
instituting Gukurahundi. The Gukurahundi genocide that occurred during Zimbabwe’s 
formative years has probably been one of the most enduring dark periods and continues to 
pose headaches on the national identity project to this day. This is true when one considers 
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the net effect of Gukurahundi as partly the creation of a pan-Ndebele particularism. Further, 
Msindo suggests that the Gukurahundi violence: 
 
left lasting impressions, perhaps more permanent than the liberation war, as it 
was accompanied by wicked, unimaginable activities that shell-shocked the 
whole of western Zimbabwe […]. The violence suffered by the peoples of 
Matabeleland forged an inseparable alliance between Ndebele identity and 
politics. Being Ndebele became both a political and linguistic expression. 
(Msindo 2012: 228) 
 
The Fifth Brigade was understood to be both political and tribal in nature; it was mostly 
composed of Shona-speaking militias, and the two regions they operated in were 
predominantly Ndebele (Blair 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Meredith 2007; Muzondidya 
2009), giving credence to arguments that it was targeted at ethnic Ndebeles. The aim here is 
not to mystify or de-mystify these but to map how this episode continues to shape national 
identity debates in the current Zimbabwe. In addition, the net result of this genocide as 
already intimated is that it ‘not only left deep scars among the victims but also intensified 
Matabeleland regionalism’ (Muzondidya 2009: 177). Björn Lindgren suggests another 
narrative about the long-term ramifications of the genocide: 
 
people in Matabeleland responded by accusing Mugabe, the government and the 
‘Shona’ in general of killing Ndebele. That is, the period after independence, and 
especially the atrocities carried out by the Fifth Brigade, heightened the victims’ 
awareness of being Ndebele at the cost of being Zimbabwean (or, for that matter, of 
being of Nguni or any other origin). Further, since the publication in 1997 of the 
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Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace’s report on the atrocities (CCJP/LRF 
1997), the discourse on the Fifth Brigade’s violence has been publicly voiced in 
Zimbabwe to new generations of Zimbabweans, which has both strengthened and 
spread feelings of Ndebeleness in southern Zimbabwe. (2005: 144) 
 
It is undeniable therefore that this violence ‘considerably affected Shona-Ndebele relations 
and continues to do so’ (Msindo 2012: 211) in contemporary Zimbabwe. Thus, postcolonial 
Zimbabwe remains under identity stress, mainly because the difficult process of nation state 
formation went wrong from independence (Mpofu 2013). Despite all these attempts to 
establish a one-party state in the first decade of independence, ZANU-PF continued to face 
strong resistance from its opponents or state organs like the judiciary and its Members of 
Parliament like Sidney Malunga, Edgar Tekere, Lazurus Nzarayebani and Byrone Hove 
among others.  
 
The media, especially broadcasting, have been Africa’s foremost force of social development, 
political mobilization and change (Kalyango and Vultee 2012), and they are the arena where 
the battle of the hearts and minds of the populace takes place. In addition, as public spheres 
where people engage in a battle of ideas the media are supposed to be inclusive of divergent 
viewpoints. There is ample evidence to suggest the central role the media play in conflict. 
With reference to Rwanda, Buckley-Zistel (2006), Mamdani (1996), Kalyango and Vultee 
(2012) and Dorman et al. (2007) concur that the media had deleterious effects in the 
escalation of violence and hate speech. To illustrate the potency of media in anchoring 
destructive nationalisms Dorman et al. (2007: 12) state that ‘state controlled media provided a 
“Twenty-four Hours Hate” to mobilise the “Hutu nation’s” citizens’. Zimbabwean state-
controlled media have played a pernicious role in covering violence at different epochs, 
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especially when perpetrated by the current government. In most cases the relationship 
between the media and the protagonists in conflict and the amount of influence imposed by 
the political and economic elite bear an influence in coverage of conflict.  
 
The silencing of the media and inflammatory coverage of the dissident activities especially in 
The Chronicle in the 1980s justified and exacerbated Mugabe’s heavy-handed approach 
towards the ‘dissidents’ by concealing the brutalities from global spectacle. Thus, the role of 
The Chronicle and of the state-controlled broadcaster Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
(ZBC) shifted from the supposed chronicler or witness of events to participants mobilizing 
public opinion towards a certain form of extreme nationalist ideology. This approach to 
conflict by the media is not isolated as demonstrated by Kingsley Moghalu, who sums up the 
role of the media in the Rwandan genocide in the following way: 
 
These ominous events were fuelled by the influence of anti-Tutsi hate propaganda 
spewed by the Radio Television Libre des MillesCollines (RTLM) and Kangura 
newspaper, and the militarisation and transformation of youth wings of the main Hutu 
political parties... In its broadcasts, RTLM claimed that the RPF’s agenda was to 
restore Tutsi hegemony and wipe out the benefits of the 1959 social revolution. It 
called for attacks against all Tutsis in Rwanda, who were branded accomplices of the 
invading RPF. (2005: 16) 
 
 
Far afield from Zimbabwe, Ethiopian media offer another case study for the roles of media in 
conflict. In the 1998 conflict with Eritrea, the Ethiopian government employed politicians to 
man the broadcasters and spread propaganda about the conflict that claimed over 100,000 
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lives. Broadcasts incited anti-Eritrean sentiments while draconian media laws were used to 
shut those media that were critical of the status quo. In most conflicts, the recent being Kenya 
in 2007, ethnicity or identity plays a major part. Difference is treated as anathema to nation-
making. Most ruling political movements in Africa advocate for the mantra that for a nation 
to subsist the tribe must die. The possibility of celebrating ethnicity and using it as a 
contributing resource to the larger nation is frowned upon. The next section forms the pith of 
this article and addresses public-owned media coverage of the Gukurahundi genocide nearly 
three decades after it ended. It specifically uses the Unity Accord holiday as a locus of focus. 
This day is at the centre of remembering and at the same time forgetting this atrocious past.  
 
Mediating genocide: Silence, forgetting and remembering 
Unity Day in Zimbabwe was born out of the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 
1987 between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in an attempt to end further spilling of blood in the 
affected regions, unmake the ethnic divisions, and cobble a notion of national identity based 
on civic identities rather than ethnic ones. This led to a merger of the two parties forming 
ZANU-PF. The Unity Accord terms were largely favourable to ZANU-PF and emasculated 
PF-ZAPU as an equal partner in the coalition in the process. This is captured by Saul Ndlovu 
when he writes ‘The practical core of that accord is to accommodate PF-ZAPU at two levels: 
Government level in the person or office of the Second Vice-President, and at political party 
level in the person or office of the national chairman of ZANU-PF’ (Anon. 2014d). The 
holiday has been a conspicuous symbol of silencing, forgetting and remembering the 
genocide. Memory is a complex process whereby people choose to remember certain 
episodes over others. In so doing, the ordering of the remembered episodes, and the 
positioning and hierarchy given to the issues, is complex and subjective. In dealing with 
Gukurahundi and Unity Day ZANU-PF has largely asserted itself as an ambiguous agent of 
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amnesia, remembering and unity at the same time. What follows below is an exploration of 
how the public-owned media in the form of The Chronicle, The Herald and The Sunday Mail 
have covered news surrounding the genocide with specific reference to the Unity Day.  
 
Unity Day discourses in state-controlled media are underpinned by the narratives of the 
liberation struggle with an emphasis on unity while ignoring the genocide, its effects and 
possible ways to gain closure especially in the face of mass dissent from mostly aggrieved 
Matabeleland and Midlands residents. Thus, the coverage in the public-owned media is 
conspicuously silent on the genocide’s historical and contextual backgrounds. For instance, 
an analysis by Caesar Zvayi in the following extract from The Herald newspaper fails to 
provide a contextualized history of the day. He writes:  
 
Zimbabweans from all walks of life mark [the] 19th anniversary of National Unity 
Day, as a public holiday… to mark the signing of Unity Accord between the country’s 
two revolutionary parties, ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU... The two parties, that 
represented the entirety of the Zimbabwean populace, put pen to paper on December 
22 1987 in Harare ensuring the peace and stability the country revels in today. It was 
not difficult for the two parties to unite as they shared common ideals and objectives 
to ensure that Zimbabweans enjoyed the fruits of independence without undue 
hindrance from outsiders. Indeed, the suffix/prefix PF in the party names denoted a 
history of shared values that saw them coming together to form the Patriotic Front in 
the late 1970s... (Anon. 2006a) 
   
The media are powerful in suppressing certain ‘divisive’ sentiments and this comes out 
clearly from the above quote. Instead of revealing the historical background of the Unity Day, 
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The Herald chooses to frame it within the dominant ZANU-PF narrative that celebrates unity 
and in the process ignores socio-politico-economic needs of the victims and their families, 
such as decent burial, truth and reconciliation or reparations so that the dead may rest in 
peace as per African customary beliefs and the living may find closure. The public-owned 
media use a single-story narrative that is politically expedient to ZANU-PF when covering 
the reverberations of the 1980s genocide. Unity Day commemorations are treated like 
birthdays in a typically conservative African cultural setting where the graphic details of 
one’s conception and birth are never addressed. But what is remembered is only the fact that 
they were born. Zimbabweans are not told the reasons for celebrating Unity Day or that it 
came about after the commitment of heinous crimes against humanity in which the state was 
the aggressor.  
 
The public-owned media have been complicit in their uncritical coverage of ZANU-PF’s 
silencing of the voices of those who want to engage on the issue. The late former deputy 
president John Nkomo’s (2009–2013) comments in the following extract are illustrative: 
   
[…] those who talk about it were never victims or were born yesterday and are too 
young to comprehend what happened and why. President Mugabe came to Bulawayo 
when we were over that period with the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo and we all 
went to Brethren-In-Christ Church here in town and he said it was a moment of 
madness. They agreed with Umdala uNkomo that it should be a closed chapter. It was 
indeed a regrettable period in our country […] people must be made to appreciate that 
in any political situation, people might lose their lives […] We have to accept that 
where there are human tribulations, such things happen. Let’s […] remember that 
what happened is history and we can’t reverse it. (Anon. 2011b) 
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John Nkomo represents the PF-ZAPU factor in ZANU-PF, and his sentiments are not 
representative of most of those who supported PF-ZAPU before the Unity Accord. The PF-
ZAPU elite that joined the coalition government with ZANU-PF treated remembering the 
genocide as an injustice to the present while forgetting that, similarly, forgetting it was an 
injustice even to the past. But one may be persuaded to understand the approach of the PF-
ZAPU members involved in the elite pact with ZANU-PF in that, as British journalist David 
Rieff suggests, ‘remembrance may be the ally of justice, but it is no reliable friend to peace, 
whereas forgetting can be’ (Anon. 2016). Joshua Nkomo was disturbed by the publication of 
the CCJP Gukurahundi Report and his reaction accentuates political elites’ attempts to 
overwrite dissent in preference of silence on the genocide. It is said that Nkomo  
 
[…] apparently stormed into the CCJP offices demanding that all copies (of the 
atrocities report) should be handed over to him […]. [He] berated the staff in Ndebele 
warning them of the danger to national unity of publication. (Zimbabwe Independent, 
9 May 1997 in Werbner 1998: 96, emphasis added)  
 
Mpofu (2014a: 172) observes that 
 
Nkomo’s use of force here is synonymous with Zanu-Pf’s attempts to institutionally 
dominate the discursive field of national identity and force debates to follow certain 
trajectories that do not impede the dominant discourses. The suspicion that discussing 
genocide may make ‘one become a target of political violence or human rights 
violations [has] permeated all aspects of life and caused great anguish’. (Barbera 
2009: 72) and has promoted silence in Zimbabwe 30 years after independence. 
20 
 
[Therefore] people have to forget for the sake of unity and as an expression of 
patriotism. 
 
Interestingly the PF-ZAPU elite did not hold consistent views (and still do not) on 
remembering and forgetting the genocide, and it appears they ‘forgot’ the genocide while 
within ZANU-PF only to remember when some of them broke away to re-form ZAPU in 
2009 led by former PF-ZAPU intelligence supremo, Dumiso Dabengwa.  
 
Official pronouncements like those of Mphoko, John and Joshua Nkomo above preserve 
places in or near the power of those Ndebele political elites that went into the coalition 
representing PF-ZAPU and to a certain extent its supporters, most of whom were victims of 
genocide, while also advantaging ZANU-PF as a ruling party in that what it says is usually 
taken as the official position that cannot be contested. Besides Mugabe’s assertion that the 
genocide was a moment of madness, if assertions from Jonathan Moyo when he was expelled 
from ZANU-PF and became an independent MP for Tsholotsho are to be relied upon, 
Mugabe speaks through his spokesperson, George Charamba, who has run a column, On the 
Other Side, in The Herald, under the pen name Natahaniel Manheru, to debate issues 
including the genocide. Moyo says, ‘Charamba’s inflammatory tribalism would ordinarily go 
unnoticed but for the fact that he is Mugabe’s trusted and loyal personal spokesperson with 
no track record of ever holding independent opinions. Charamba speaks for Mugabe. Put 
differently, Mugabe speaks through Charamba’ (Moyo, 11 December 2009). According to 
Charamba, the ‘so-called’ Gukurahundi genocide is just some ‘disturbances which affected 
some parts of Matabeleland and Midlands... until the 1987 Unity Accord cured them’ (The 
Herald (Anon. 2014c). If Moyo’s assertions that Charamba’s sentiments are Mugabe’s are to 
be taken seriously, then there is an official underplaying of the magnitude of the genocide. 
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ZANU-PF has consistently used violence to deal with dissent, including against those who 
engage in Gukurahundi debates or who hold memorial services or try to engage with its 
trauma through art and other cultural activities. During the 2009–2013 Government of 
National Unity between ZANU-PF and two formations of the MDC, the Global Political 
Agreement provided a provision for the Ministry of National Healing and Reconciliation. 
ZANU-PF used its political muscle to silence people, even cabinet ministers for that ministry. 
Minister and MDC MP Moses Mzila-Ndlovu and Father Marko Mnkandla, a catholic priest, 
were arrested for attending a memorial service for the genocide victims in Lupane. The use of 
State Repressive Apparatus like the police and army to curtail debates and commemorations 
has negatively affected community cohesion, participation in and networks of protest since 
the 1980s. The potential effectiveness of such protests or networks has been systematically 
dismantled to an extent that people fear to be protagonists in major political activities that 
affect their lives (Barbera 2009).  
 
Besides a consistent effort from ZANU-PF to forcibly make people forget genocide and 
interfere with memorial services or any attempts to find ‘spiritual’ connection and closure of 
the same, ZANU-PF is here suppressing ethnic rituals and particularism in favour of national 
unity. Similar tactics have been used before; for instance, in 1997 the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) allegedly stopped villagers from erecting a headstone with victims’ 
names on a mass grave in a memorial commemoration of the Fifth Brigade victims in Lupane 
(Werbner 1998). Due to fear, the community obliged and the only inscription on the 
headstone at the end of the day was that day’s date. In short, when people are ‘trapped in the 
fear of fear’ (Ibacache et al. in Barbera 2009: 75) and terrors of remembering and forgetting 
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they end up not knowing the demarcations between what is safe and dangerous to discuss and 
commemorate where ‘ticklish’ (Mhlanga 2012) cultural issues are involved.  
 
Contemporary debates on national belonging suggest that contrary to the myth that the Unity 
Day ‘was in the interest of the people and not of the two political parties’ (Anon. 2013a) or 
that it ‘was home-grown […]. Agreement between Zimbabweans themselves’ (Anon. 2012) 
meant ‘to bury the hatchet and launch the beginning of a new era’ (Anon. 2011a) has been 
subject to contestations from various quarters within Zimbabwe and in the diaspora (Mpofu 
2014a, 2014b). Those contesting the Unity Day argue it was an elite pact that led to ZANU-
PF swallowing PF-ZAPU leading to the continuation of the segregation of the Midlands and 
Matabeleland regions, exacerbating feelings of alienation among the Ndebele people (Mpofu 
2013, 2014a). These feelings of alienation have led some pressure groups like the Mthwakazi 
Liberation Front, Imbovane Yamahlabezulu, Vukani Mahlabezulu and ZAPU 2000 among 
others calling for secession (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Mpofu 2014a). Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s book, 
Do Zimbabweans exist? (2009), dismantles the taken-for-granted perception that ‘The Unity 
Accord solidified and formalised that we are one’ (Anon. 2013a). People who contest the 
abuse and dismiss the relevance of the Unity Accord to ordinary Zimbabweans are labelled 
‘mad’ (Anon. 2013a) or dismissed as ‘detractors who are sponsored by the same inimical 
forces that sustained the dissidents, want Zimbabweans to forget that the dissidents were an 
Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesian project’ (Anon. 2006a). 
  
In some cases they are also branded as agents of the West and a threat to unity as 
demonstrated by the following quotation from The Herald newspaper:  
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 The unity among Zimbabweans has been constantly attacked by the country’s 
detractors and those who want to manipulate its people. Western nations, particularly 
Britain are now employing some devious means of deciding Zimbabweans by 
creating and funding opposition political parties. The funded opposition political 
parties such as the MDC are often dangerous and are bent on dividing the people on 
tribal lines. The British sponsored violence in the country by funding the MDC to 
embark on mass protests soon after the presidential election last year. (Anon. 2003) 
   
The state-controlled media do not question ZANU-PF’s posturing as the only legitimate party 
to rule Zimbabwe based on its liberation war credentials. The underlying perception is that 
the Unity Accord was signed on behalf of all Zimbabweans and therefore there is no space 
for opposition parties contesting ZANU-PF’s legitimacy. The dismissal of other political 
formations with policies contrary to those of ZANU-PF is an attempt to maintain hegemony 
and ZANU-PF’s ideologies on cultural nationalism. These narratives on the Unity Accord, its 
relevance and the meanings of ‘unity’ in state-controlled media fail to capture the day’s 
essence especially in a politically polarized Zimbabwe and highly factionalized context. 
 
In 2006 when the current ZANU-PF higher rducation and former information minister 
Jonathan Moyo was an independent Member of Parliament for Tsholotsho after his expulsion 
from ZANU-PF he wrote but never tabled in parliament the Gukurahundi Memorial Bill with, 
among other things, an intention of establishing a Gukurahundi National Memorial Board and 
Gukurahundi National Memorial shrine meant to ‘promote lasting national cohesion, unity, 
truth, reconciliation, stability, conflict prevention and the permanent healing of emotive and 
divisive wounds’ and criminalized any denialism of the genocide. The Sunday Mail reacted to 
this by suggesting that it was a plan ‘to divide the country along tribal lines by sponsoring a 
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parliamentary Bill that analysts say is aimed at opening wounds of the political disturbances 
that occurred in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s’. The story further quotes an 
analyst saying:  
 
He knows quite well that the Bill will not sail through but he is seeking to reopen 
wounds of that bad patch by institutionalizing the conflict. It is an attempt to abuse the 
parliamentary system to make up for his weak position as a solitary independent MP. 
Above all, the Bill is meant to project him as a champion of one ethnic group in the 
country, hoping to use that as a platform for his political future. (Anon. 2006b) 
 
John Nkomo who was Speaker of Parliament then said about Moyo’s Bill: 
 
Even President Mugabe has acknowledged Gukurahundi as a time of madness, which 
must never be repeated, so that means government is in a position to redress what 
happened then without having to be bound by any bills… We must be careful when 
handling such issues because they affect the national unity symbolised by the 
unification of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU into the united ZANU-PF we have today. 
Gukurahundi has always been steeped in tribal overtones pitting the Ndebele against 
the Shona, and no one wants to revisit such a divisive era. (Anon. 2007) 
 
 
What is significant from the above is that ZANU-PF uses its political domination of the post-
genocide era to control debates on national identity. The contradictory articulation of the 
genocide issue reveals discursive power imbalances that surround Gukurahundi and Unity 
Day within ZANU-PF. To highlight this, Werbner asserts that buried memory was and still is 
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‘Mugabe’s own demand. Ironically, he continues to call for forgetting the past where he most 
commemorates it’ (Werbner 1998: 96).  
 
Even when a context of the genocide is provided in public-owned media stories there remains 
a lacuna, especially when such reportage undermines the excessive manner in which ZANU-
PF attempted to deal with the dissident activities and the resultant trauma. The following 
extract helps demonstrate this assertion: 
 
One of the most important moments in the history of Zimbabwe is 22 December 
1987. That is the day when ZANU, led by President Mugabe and ZAPU, led by Vice-
President Joshua Nkomo signed the Unity Accord to end civil disturbances in 
Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. On this day people will celebrate the importance 
of peace and unity in the country. This is the day which saw people who couldn’t 
drink tea together, become one, sharing a common goal, which is unity for the 
development of the country. (Anon. 2013b) 
 
The Unity Accord was signed by Zanu and ZAPU in 1987. President Mugabe and the 
late Vice President Joshua Nkomo signed the Unity Accord in 1987 to bridge the 
tribal gulf that led to political disturbances in the Matabeleland region soon after 
independence. (Anon. 2009) 
 
The historic 1987 agreement was signed to end division between the two 
revolutionary parties… [which] turned rivals and contested elections separately. The 
repercussion of such an arrangement saw anti-Zimbabwe elements from the former 
Rhodesian regime, with the support of Apartheid South Africa, spur dissent between 
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1980–1983… The resultant reaction to the dissention in Matabeleland led to 
Gukurahundi where the Government deployed forces to suppress the ensuing 
Turbulence. (Anon. 2014b) 
   
 
In most stories it is the voices of the ZANU-PF officials that ventilate discussions on Unity 
Day and they speak from a politically expedient and taken-for-granted position that the 
public-owned media have failed to scrutinize. ZANU-PF politburo member Cephas Msipa 
asserts that ‘[T]he main aim of Unity Accord has been achieved- that is to make people of 
Zimbabwe feel that they are one regardless of any other differences that exist but we are one 
people’ (Anon. 2013). That the day is contested as demonstrated by research (Mpofu 2016) 
seems not to matter and this amounts to stripping citizens off any form of agency.  
 
The only time the discourse in the public sphere gets closer to addressing the 
incomprehensible trail of trauma that is the legacy of the genocide is when it is referred to 
mildly as ‘Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances’ (Anon. 2006b), ‘differences’, ‘fighting’ 
(Anon. 2013), ‘political and civil conflicts within our nation’ (Anon. 2011a), ‘turbulence’ 
(Anon. 2014), or as Mugabe said ‘a moment of madness that should never be repeated’ 
(Mpofu 2014) or as reported by The Herald while quoting Mugabe, ‘“Along the way there 
was fighting. It is regretted”, referring to post-independence disturbances in Matabeleland 
and Midlands regions. “We re-united ourselves and reminded ourselves that we are one 
people. There is need for us not to let go on the land […]”’ (Anon. 2008). 
 
From the above, it is clear that ZANU-PF and Mugabe with the public media playing a 
complicit role are uncomfortable in addressing the genocide issue in its entirety and this 
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informs the use by ordinary citizens of social media and other alternative fora to contest 
ZANU-PF’s selective use of collective memory on the genocide. Contrary to Moyo’s (2009: 
62) argument that ‘news is a great myth or ideology maker where journalists unconsciously 
act as the agents’ it seems the public media deliberately play a complicit role by failing to 
critique the status quo. Again it seems public media journalists are consciously supporting 
ZANU-PF’s versions of cultural nationhood and this is informed by the political economy of 
public media in Zimbabwe. Public media have narrated the story of unity in frames that 
legitimate and naturalize ZANU-PF’s hegemony while downplaying the urgent need to 
address the 1980s excesses so as to create authentic unity that could be brought through an 
inclusive national healing project.   
 
Genocide and tensions within ZANU-PF  
ZANU-PF’s discourses regarding the genocide reflect intra-party tensions expressing 
themselves through ethnic and factional fault lines. ZANU-PFs top–down amnesia regarding 
Gukurahundi contrasts with its obsession with remembering the colonial injustices that are 
graphically described by Mugabe during Independence Day and Heroes Day or Defence 
Forces Day commemorations (Mpofu 2014: 2016). This unmasks ZANU-PF’s fear and 
insecurity on sustaining legitimacy amidst intra-party tensions and dissent from some 
sections of society. However, internal conflicts regarding the genocide within ZANU-PF are 
devastating and expose craters on ZANU-PFs homogeneity as a party. This is notable from 
two extracts below from the current vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was Minister 
of State Security during the genocide, and Jonathan Moyo, respectively: 
 
 The unity accord is a symbol of national unity. It was a profound and decisive 
initiative meant to reconcile the two revolutionary parties, ZANU-PF and PF-
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ZAPU. President Mugabe and Dr. Nkomo reached a consensus. There is really 
nothing that ZANU-PF needs to be open about now because Dr. Nkomo was 
also part of ZANU-PF.… We do not want to undermine efforts by our national 
leaders to reunite the people. If we try to open healed wounds by discussing 
such issues, we will be undermining and failing to recognise the statesmanship 
exhibited by President Mugabe and his counterpart, Dr Nkomo when they 
signed the Unity Accord in 1987. (Anon. 2011c) 
 
The Gukurahundi issue is not a closed chapter. President Mugabe made a 
paradigmatic statement in 2000 when he described it as a moment of madness, 
which it indeed was, but there’s nothing that has been done since 2000 to use 
that very important statement by the President to bring the matter to finality or 
closure. I strongly believe that only ZANU-PF can lead the process of 
bringing that matter to closure building on what President Mugabe said in 
2000. And the party can do that by being willing to publicly engage the issue 
in an open, honest and non-defensive way, which has characterised our 
attitude thus far. That was a dark point in our history as an independent nation 
which not only involved dissidents who committed atrocities and wantonly 
destroyed property but also the State whose response to the dissident menace, 
which clearly had illegal and mercenary support and direction from apartheid 
South Africa, was so outrageously disproportionate as to cause unnecessary 
suffering among ordinary people which could have otherwise been avoided. 
(Anon. 2011d) 
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Clearly ZANU-PF does not have a consistent narrative on the genocide as whatever 
narratives are available are replete with contradictions and tensions. The Unity Day and 
Gukurahundi narrative seek at one point to remember and dis-member; and, at another, to 
forget the genocide, generating tension between ZANU-PF and victims or survivors. These 
tensions have burdened ZANU-PF’s attempts at maintaining political legitimacy and building 
a hegemonic and cohesive brand of national identity. Like Renan (1990) in Qu’est-ce qu’une 
nation? (What is a Nation?) Mnangagwa implores his countrymen to forget inauspicious 
episodes in the history of Zimbabwe as this is the basis for constructing a nation. As Renan 
(1990) said, the worst must be forgotten for the nation to subsist. While remembering can be 
the basis of soul searching, truth telling, healing and a way of gaining closure there are 
clashing arguments towards forgetting and the deliberate rewriting of history. One argument 
is that the best way to deal with the genocide is to find closure through open and direct 
dialogic confrontation with the violence while another is that ‘it was a moment of madness’ 
and people need to move on. But there is need to question who was mad? Why? What could 
be done to heal the madman and his victims!  
 
From Mnangagwa’s statement above it is not clear what is being forgotten but what is clear 
are the reasons for forgetting. He could be speaking on behalf of the state as a minister and 
also as someone who is largely responsible for the genocide, hence the need to assert himself 
as an agent of amnesia. Whereas the colonial memory has been used by ZANU-PF to 
consolidate national identity, the narrative of Unity Day alludes to ‘the process of 
remembering [and becoming] selective, incorporating acts of forgetting’ (Stewart 2000: 384) 
for political ends.  
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Mnangagwa’s statement neglects to factor in the healing and the memory of those who were 
killed, while Moyo’s statement suggests the need for truth telling, healing and closure. Again 
it is important to notice that Jonathan Moyo has never been an advocate for silence about the 
genocide, and his assertion that indeed this was a moment of madness is pointed. He has 
always undermined certain pronouncements by Mugabe on social media, and some sections 
of society have believed that he is in ZANU-PF to destroy the party. He wants the issue 
addressed as he too lost his father through this yet-to-be-addressed genocide. This neatly 
contrasts with the Rwandase case where the government of the day has held those responsible 
accountable through traditional courts called the Gacaca, and created memorial sites where 
genocide is memorialized and victims remembered. In so doing, national cohesion, justice, 
accountability and unity are fostered (Ibreck 2009). The temporal process of healing, 
forgetting and remembering does not only have to be an elite-driven project, as is the case in 
Zimbabwe, but has to include the living and the dead, victims and perpetrators acting and 
meeting at the same level. 
 
It is important to point out that one cannot forget that which she or he does not remember; 
hence, this forgetting advocated by ZANU-PF is problematic as it is done outside 
remembering and the confines of a truth and reconciliation statutory body. It becomes 
‘negative heritage’ (Bell in Zehfuss Maja 2006). Maja Zehfuss  poignantly sums it up thus: 
‘[A]lthough remembering and forgetting are clearly opposed to each other in debates over 
memory, and the former valued over the latter, they are inextricably linked: remembering 
always already entails forgetting and forgetting is possible only where there is remembering 
in the first place’ (2006: 213). 
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This fear permeates the whole society as those fearful or those who hold the memory need 
not be direct victims of the genocide, but, as Rojas (1996: 63) argues (in Barbera 2009), all 
people (and even those who did not experience violence) ‘have... been submitted to the terror, 
the fear, the psychological manipulation, the human transfiguration’ of violence. This is also 
accentuated by one of Barbera’s (2009: 75) interlocutors in her article on memory in a 
Chilean Shantytown who says that memory of violence ‘leads [us] to continue to live in a 
constant state of internalised fear’. 
  
Conclusion 
After a conflict it is important for societies to engage in situated unification and healing 
projects where all citizens may be able to recognize themselves. From the foregoing this 
research has demonstrated that history telling, remembrance, memory and narrating the 
nation are political projects that include a struggle over power and who gets to decide the 
future. Zimbabwe’s public media have largely played a subservient role in supporting and 
advancing ZANU-PFs agenda of nation-building through coercively controlling the 
narratives on Unity Day. The coverage of Unity Day renders state-controlled media ‘lapdogs’ 
of the ZANU-PF-dominated political system. In some instances such strategies as 
intimidation and labelling opponents of ZANU-PFs approaches to the Unity Day as internal 
enemies or sell-outs of the struggle being used by former colonists or other outside enemies 
of the state. Forgetting and insisting that the genocide was addressed by Mugabe’s statement 
that it was a moment of madness has been used to mask ethnic differences and tensions. This 
way of dealing with conflict only wishes it away but the fact remains that the hatchet was 
buried and a mark always lingers on, suggesting the possibility of ethnic implosion in the 
future. Even though not used in this research, there are a lot of dissenting voices against 
Unity Day in Zimbabwe and this means that there are some ‘Zimbabweans’ who see 
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themselves as outsiders to the nation after having experienced the genocide. Instead of 
insisting on ‘the moment of madness’ narrative in an attempt to create a politically correct 
national identity that denies the multi-ethnic mosaic as central to the creation of the nation 
there is need for an open dialogue where members of the community may share their 
thoughts, experiences and dreams.  
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